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Abstract
Since 1990, not only the number of signed preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) has increased, but also their depth. That means, PTAs include com-
prehensive rules, which go way beyond tariff reductions, such as property
rights, competition or investment provisions. This paper argues that espe-
cially in North-South agreements there is a diffusion of institutional quality
from developed to developing countries. First, a PTA may affect institutions
because it can serve as a network for political exchange and second, the reg-
ulations and commitments stipulated in it may affect local institutions in the
South. I empirically investigate if there are positive effects of being a member
in a PTA on the quality of institutions in developing countries by accounting
for the number and the depth of PTAs using the Design of Trade Agreements
(DESTA) database, established by Du¨r, Baccini and Elsig (2014). I create a
large panel data set covering 32 years to account for endogeneity of several
controls. The results support the hypothesis that deep PTAs lead to an im-
proved quality of institutions in the South. The results differ with respect to
the type of agreement and region.
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1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, a surge in the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)1,
signed per year, can be observed. While there were 161 PTAs signed until 1990, the
cumulative number of trade agreements increased to 621 agreements in 2015. Figure
1 shows the cumulative number of PTAs which have been signed since 1948 until
2015 by stance of development of the trading partners involved, i.e. between de-
veloped countries, North-North (N-N), between developing countries, South-South
(S-S), and between developed and developing countries, North-South (N-S). The
overall number has risen but especially N-S trade agreements (long-dashed line),
and S-S trade agreements (short-dashed line) show the largest increases.
Figure 1: Number of signed trade agreements by region
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Source: Author's calculations based on DESTA database.
What is the motive to enter a PTA? In the first place, regional integration happens
due to economic reasons. Gaining market access is the traditional motive, as for
example stated by Hillman and Moser (1996). In accordance to this, since the es-
tablishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which later
became the World Trade Organization (WTO), tariffs have been decreasing on a
multilateral level so that even developing countries enjoy tariff-free market access to
important markets. Zero most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs have lead to increased
trade by developing countries (United Nations, 2013). On average, developed coun-
tries have lower levels than developing countries. But the latest WTO round of
1In this paper, PTAs are referred to all types of preferential trade agreements, including regional
trade agreements.
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negotiations, the Doha Round, which has started in 2001, has come to a halt, while
regional integration continues to accelerate (Lima˜o, 2016).
It seems that market access plays a more important role in symmetric agreements,
that is in N-N and S-S relations. This can also be seen in the actual debate be-
tween the US and the EU and the US-President’s threat to increase tariffs on EU
products to gain more favorable trade terms. Freund (2004) argues that countries
with similar cost structures are likely to require reciprocal trade liberalization to be
self-enforcing. This is less the case in N-S trade agreements. She finds empirical
evidence that reciprocity is important in symmetric trade agreements while there
is only modified reciprocity in N-S trade agreements. North countries, in general,
gain more market access compared to developing countries.2 At the same time, de-
veloping countries already have good market access generated by the ”Everything
but Arms” (EBA) provision by the EU or the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), where developing and least developed countries are provided additional tariff
concessions, which do not fall within the scope of the most favored nation (MFN)
principle. So this cannot explain the ongoing increase in signature rates of PTAs.
Besides the increase in the number of trade agreements, it can be observed that the
newly signed PTAs tend to include a broader set of provisions, which go beyond at-
the-border rules, like the reduction of tariffs, export subsidies or taxes and beyond
WTO rules. There are ”WTO+” rules, which expand or deepen existing WTO
rules and countries define beyond-market-access commitments in areas, which do not
directly affect trade flows, such as intellectual property rights, competition policy,
anti-corruption and human rights, public administration, innovation policies, data
protection and statistics and industrial cooperation (World Trade Organization,
2016, p. 129).
These commitments are behind-the-border rules and affect domestic policies. The
more provisions are defined, which go beyond at the border rules, the deeper are
the agreements. In other words, the depth of an agreement indicates the extend
of the commitments, which the member states have bargained on. The more rules
are specified in different areas of an agreement and the more those rules regulate
the cooperation between the member states, the deeper is this agreement. Figure 2
shows the development of the mean depth of all signed trade agreements where data
on depth is available. This measure is calculated on the basis of an additive index
created by Du¨r, Baccini, and Elsig (2014), adding up the key provisions, which
can be included in a PTA. One point is added if a PTA is more than a partial
2A ten percent reduction of a tariff in a developing country leads to a tariff reduction in the
developed country of only 2 percent (Freund, 2004).
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Figure 2: Depth of trade agreements over time
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scope agreement or if it includes substantive provisions in one of the six areas: (1)
services, (2) investments, (3) standards, (4) public procurement, (5) competition
and (6) intellectual property rights. The index can range from 0 (when a PTA is
only a partial scope agreement and does not include any provisions in one of the
above areas) to 7 (for PTAs, which are more than a partial scope agreement and
includes substantive provisions in all areas). A substantive provision is a definite
regulation in one of the areas, while for example the desire to start trading in the
services area is not treated as a substantive provision. So, while there has been a
sideways movement to a higher number of PTAs there is a parallel movement to an
increase in depth starting only slightly earlier in the mid 1980s.
The increased depth of PTAs provides additional motives for the formation of PTAs.
One motive for developing countries, is that trade agreements have become an instru-
ment to promote development. They intend to implement domestic reforms, which
go beyond trade liberalization and import higher policy standards to foster growth.
Schiff and Winters (1998) argue that developing countries might use PTAs to lock
in policies because there is a higher credibility of enforcement in those agreements.
Developing countries may chose a partner, who helps them to credibly promote
policy agendas, accompanied by financial and knowledge transfers. Compared to
multilateral agreements, PTAs offer less coordination effort and a targeted choice of
a partner. Levy (2009) investigates the function of a PTA to increase a country’s
commitment to better governance by having a particular look at the United States-
Peru Free Trade Agreement. Peru has gone through a period of very poor political
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and economic management and thus has an urgent motive to achieve credibility in
pursuing better policies and reforms. He finds that Peru was preferably interested
in locking in policies instead of gaining market access, since it already had virtu-
ally free market access to the US. Interviews with Peruvian officials, academics and
businessmen showed clearly that the agreement was expected to have a significant
improvement on the rule of law and a better investment environment. This case
study suggests that countries from the South sign PTAs with the North to promote
the international attractiveness as well as domestic and foreign investment.
Also countries from the North aim at promoting the development process in coun-
tries from the South (Lima˜o, 2016, p.50). They intend to improve institutions and
governance in developing countries because the legal system in those countries is
poor and often there are no secured property and human rights, missing democratic
structures and courts, while political leaders are corrupt. Many RTAs contain reg-
ulations on pro-competitive practices, transparency, stronger anti-corruption and
intellectual property rights, movement of capital and labor and investment. The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, represents a very
broad and far-reaching agreement with a depth index of 7. Besides chapters on trade
in goods and technical barriers to trade, it contains chapters on investment, services,
administrative and institutional provisions and intellectual property. Article 1110
of the investment chapter, for instance, interdicts expropriation of any investment
of any party and regulates exceptions and compensations. The Cotonou Agreement
on the other hand remains more general and only has a depth index of 1. It focuses
on the aim to gradually remove all trade barriers, cooperate politically and promote
dialog and poverty reduction without a concrete schedule. Article 17(2), for exam-
ple, states that the agreement commits to the promotion of democratic processes
through dialogue and consultation and to promote institutional reform. Still, this
shows that PTAs now also serve as a promoter of institutions and political change.
The intention of this paper is to analyze whether trade agreements between North
and South do affect the quality of institutions in the South. First, I argue that
the membership in a PTA, without considering the depth, may improve institutions
in the South because PTAs can serve as a platform where politicians can discuss
policies and and interchange political experience and skills. Often political leaders
in a developing country lack experience and skills when they come into position
(Afegbua & Adejuwon, 2012). Especially African countries lack competent leaders
(Adeyemi, 2017). One reason might be that patrimonialism is persistent (Acemoglu
& Robinson, 2010) and new political leaders lack a previous political career. The
exchange of knowledge is especially intensive in the period when the agreement is
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negotiated, so already before it is actually signed and an effect should be seen in the
period afterwards. Second, the deeper the agreement, the higher the improvement
in institutional quality. That means, rules as, for example, defined in the investment
chapter of NAFTA, might positively affect the institutional quality in the South.
These rules compensate for missing institutions in the developing country, which are
standard in the North.
In the literature, institutions play a prominent role in explaining economic perfor-
mance and growth (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-
De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; Rodrik, 2007) or trade pattern (Anderson
& Marcouiller, 2002; Berkowitz, Moenius, & Pistor, 2006; de Groot, Henry L. F.,
Linders, Rietveld, & Subramanian, 2004; Nunn, 2007). Thus it is important to de-
termine the factors of good institutions. The research on drivers of institutional
change is growing. There are studies focusing on political factors of institutional
change, such as free media (Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Norris, 2008) or foreign aid
(Ear, 2007; Knack, 2004; Tavares, 2003) and on economic factors like trade (Busse,
Borrmann, Fischer, & Gro¨ning, 2007; Islam & Montenegro, 2002; Levchenko, 2013)
or FDI (Larrain & Tavares, 2004; Pinto & Zhu, 2016). Most of those studies use
cross-sectional data. The paper most closely related to the present analysis is Busse
et al. (2007). They also investigate the effect of trade agreements on institutions
but focus on the effects of NAFTA on Mexico and of the EU accession on the ac-
cessing countries, while I work with a comprehensive country sample. Furthermore
they model the agreements as a single dummy variable, while the depth of the trade
agreements plays a central role in my analysis.
For the analysis, I utilize the data set on ”the design of trade agreements” (DESTA)
by Du¨r et al. (2014) for measures relating to PTAs and the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) to measure institutional quality. I create a data set including
PTAs between North and South and concentrate on the effects on the institutional
quality in the developing country. The use of a comprehensive data set allows for
more general conclusions. Furthermore, I work with a panel data set covering a
period of 32 years. The time dimension is useful in an econometric sense to correct
for endogeneity and the long period of time includes more changes in the institutional
quality, which only slowly develop. For the main explanatory variables I include the
number of signed PTAs and the depth for each developing country and period.
I find that depth is an important driver, which positively affects institutional qual-
ity. However, the results differ with respect to the type of agreement and regions
included.
As the literature on institutions suggests, institutions play an important role for
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development and thus the analysis of factors of change in institutions may provide
important insides for politicians of developing countries or developed countries who
promote development abroad or for international organizations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next chapter summarizes the related
literature on the factors of change in institutional quality and outlines related work
on learning and the diffusion of knowledge and political reform. The third chap-
ter presents the estimation framework, the data used for the estimation, and the
discussion of results. The final chapter concludes.
2 Related Literature
The related empirical literature on the factors of change in institutions sheds light on
important control variables to be included in the empirical analysis. Furthermore,
the literature on learning provides an intuition why PTAs are a suitable instrument
to transfer knowledge and experience.
An important part of the related literature reveals the critical factors of institutional
quality, which need to be included in the empirical analysis. It can be seen that
most of the related empirical literature uses cross-sectional data. Factors of change
can broadly be divided into political, social, geographic and economic factors. One
strand of the cross-sectional literature relate the initial conditions of a country to
its subsequent level of institutional quality. These studies explain why institutions
in some countries are well-developed, while in other countries institutions are weak.
Acemoglu et al. (2001), for example, use settler mortality rates and other controls
(latitude, climate, religion and natural resources) to explain the level of current in-
stitutional quality. European colonialism is also linked to differences in institutional
quality by referring to the associated legal system. La Porta et al. (1997), Straub
(2000) and Chong and Zanforlin (2000) analyze the effects of different legal origins
on the quality of institutions and find that inferior institutions are developed in
countries with a French legal origin, where the government is much more interven-
tionist and investor protection is weakest. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1999) also show that ethnic heterogeneity is related to poor institutions.
However, these factors do not explain how institutions change over time and thus are
inappropriate for the empirical analysis over time. Important drivers of institutional
quality, which include a time dimension are mainly political and economic ones. The
freedom of the press as, for example, revealed by Norris (2008) and Brunetti and
Weder (2003), is an important political driver. Foreign aid is also analyzed as a
factor of change in a number of papers but its effect is inconclusive. While Tavares
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(2003) results indicate that foreign aid has a positive effect on corruption, meaning
a reduction of corruption, Knack (2001), Ear (2007) and Djankov, Montalvo, and
Reynal-Querol (2008) find a negative effect of aid on different measures of institu-
tions, including corruption. With respect to economic determinants, empirical work
focuses on openness and FDI, which are often related to corruption. The effects
of FDI on institutions do not show clear results. Larrain and Tavares (2004) and
Okada and Samreth (2012) study the effects of FDI on corruption and show that
FDI reduces corruption, while Pinto and Zhu (2016) also account for the develop-
ment level of host countries, which reveals that FDI increases corruption in least
developed countries while there are no effects resulting from FDI in all remaining
countries. Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Wei (2000) show that more open economies
tend to have lower corruption levels due to higher competition. Busse et al. (2007);
Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005); Islam and Montenegro (2002); Rigobon and Rodrik
(2005) find a positive and significant effect of openness on different measures of in-
stitutions. But Knack and Azfar (2003) show that the results for openness are very
sensitive to the choice and number of countries. For data sets including more coun-
tries than those used by other authors the effect of openness is no longer present. In
all studies, income and population size represent essential further control variables
for institutional quality, which change over time. Busse et al. (2007), Gassebner,
Gaston, and Lamla (2011) and Quazi and Alam (2015) add to the literature by in-
cluding the time dimension in their empirical work. These panel studies add human
capital and political freedom as further controls, which change over time.
Another part of the related literature focuses on the diffusion of knowledge and poli-
cies between economies and provides intuition for the link between trade agreements
and institutional reform. First, it is stated, for example, by Islam and Montenegro
(2002) that policies can diffuse from one country to another, especially when coun-
tries trade with each other. They argue that the risk that arises from trading with
unknown partners increases the incentive to improve domestic institutions as domes-
tic and foreign firms demand for reform. Then, open economies learn from trading
partners where successful and effective institutions are implemented. Second, Sim-
mons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006) explain this process of learning by the theory of
Bayesian updating and outline the factors, which play a role for successful trans-
mission of knowledge or reform. They explain that learning from other economies
is based on the successful outcome of policies abroad, which is then transferred to
the domestic country. The success of this transmission depends on the availabil-
ity of information on the outcome and the expertise and experience to evaluate
the information. The diffusion of policies is more effective, the closer countries are
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linked to each other so that a better communication is possible. By signing trade
agreements, countries intensify their relationship and facilitate communication for
a better exchange of knowledge.
Empirical evidence for the diffusion of reforms is provided by Gassebner et al. (2011),
who study whether implemented economic reforms in one country affect the reforms
in other countries. They find empirical support for reform spillovers and further-
more, find that trade itself is not promoting diffusion of political reform while cul-
tural and geographic proximity are important drivers. The positive effect of spacial
proximity for learning is supported by the results of Mancusi (2008) who analyzes
the effect of knowledge spillovers on innovation on a sectoral level. She finds evi-
dence that knowledge spillovers are fostered due to technical and spacial proximity
between source and recipient. These results show that spatial proximity promotes
the ability of spillovers and supports the argument that trade agreements promote
these effects. PTAs can serve as a communication network where information and
knowledge is exchanged. When countries negotiate on a PTA, spatial proximity is
reduced and knowledge exchange is possible.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of trade agreements between
North and South on the quality of institutions in the South over the period of 1984
until 2015. To account for the effects of the sole membership in a PTA I introduce the
number of PTAs, signed by a country from the South.3 To capture the effects of the
depth of PTAs, I use the additive index from DESTA, which measures the amount
and extent of commitments included in a PTA. As noted above, there are important
other determinants of the quality of institutions, which I include as further controls.
For the choice of controls, I refer to the related literature on the determinants of
institutional change with a focus on those determinants, which change over time.
These controls include income, population, education, freedom of the press and the
presence of conflicts.
3In the Appendix, I include a list of all North and South countries, as well as a description of
all variables and sources.
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3.1.1 Dependent Variable
The measure for the quality of institutions comes from the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) database. There are further available measures for institutions,
like the World Governance Indicators (WGIs) by the World Bank or the Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW) Index by the Fraser Institute. But the ICRG data set
is the most comprehensive data set covering 141 countries and starting in the year
1984. It includes the largest number of observations without gaps.
Table 1: Political Risk Components
Component Points (max.)
Government Stability 12
Socioeconomic Conditions 12
Investment Profile 12
Internal Conflict 12
External Conflict 12
Corruption 6
Military in Politics 6
Religious Tensions 6
Law and Order 6
Ethnic Tensions 6
Democratic Accountability 6
Bureaucracy Quality 4
Total 100
The ICRG data set measures the risk of a country in three categories, political,
financial and economic risk. Each category consists of components, which are added
together to an index for each category and finally to an overall risk rating for each
country. To achieve consistency of the rating between countries and over time, a
number of basic questions are predefined to create the index. All categories consist of
several components, which have a minimum value of zero, indicating the highest risk
and the maximum value indicating the lowest potential risk. The maximum values,
varying from 4 to 12, represent the importance with respect to the overall risk,
measured for each category. Table 1 lists the 12 components of the Political Risk
rating and its maximum points, adding up to a total score of 100 points. While
”Bureaucracy Quality” for example is assessed least important with 4 maximum
points, ”Government Stability”, ”Socioeconomic Conditions”, ”Investment Profile”,
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”External Conflict” and ”Internal Conflict” are considered most important with a
maximum of 12 points, when assessing the overall risk.
In this analysis the Political Risk component ”Investment Profile” is used to measure
the institutional quality. It accounts for institutional aspects, which are particularly
important with regard to trade or foreign direct investment and consequently are
expected to be affected by trade agreements and their contents. It measures the
general risk to investment and is composed of three sub-components. One compo-
nent is ”Contract Viability/Expropriation”, which quantifies the potential risk that
any contracts are modified or completely canceled or the risk that foreign owned
assets are expropriated. This reflects an important risk for exporting firms, having
contracts with foreign firms or for investors, investing in foreign countries. An-
other component measures ”Profits Repatriation”. This component assesses how
well profits can be transferred out of the host country and thus also evaluates the
bureaucratic efficiency, the banking system and exchange controls, all of which are
aspects, trading firms and foreign investors have to deal with. The third component,
measures ”Payment Delays”, which is also affected by a poor banking system and an
inefficient bureaucratic system. In addition, this component assesses other factors,
which influence delays in payments, like foreign exchange position and formal and
informal government policies or motivations. The overall component sums up over
the sub-components and has a maximum score of 12 points.
3.1.2 Data on Trade Agreements
For measures related to trade agreements, i.e. for the number of PTAs signed and
their depth, the DESTA database Du¨r et al. (2014) is used. The data set not
only provides a comprehensive list of trade agreements, but also includes detailed
information on various characteristics of each agreement, especially on the scope
of the specified provisions, (i.e. the depth of an agreement). In the most recently
available data set, a total number of 810 trade agreements are listed in DESTA
over a period between 1948 and 2015. Detailed information on the depth of trade
agreements and other information like the type of agreement in terms of integration
level, membership (i.e. bilateral, plurilateral, plurilateral-bilateral, etc.), number
of member states, regional dummies, and information on the language is available
for 618 PTAs. Furthermore, for each PTA, all member states are listed, which is
required to get country-level data. To create a variable that counts the number of
signed PTAs for each country and year, the data was transformed accordingly. In
a next step, for each country the cumulative sum of signed agreements in each year
was calculated. There are some countries, who have already signed PTAs before the
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first period, which is covered in this analysis. So not all countries start with zero
PTAs.
Figure 3: Number of PTAs signed on average by a country from different
regions between 1948 until 2015
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Figure 3 shows the number of PTAs, countries with a different status of development
or from different regions (North, South or SSA) have signed on average (1) over the
whole period included in the DESTA data set, which means since 1948 (dark blue
bar), (2) since 1990, the period when the overall signature rates of trade agreements
increases (light blue bar), and (3) all PTAs, signed only between North and South
(N-S) since 1948 (mid blue bar). South includes all countries from the South exclud-
ing countries from Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA). SSA plays a specific role as it performs
poorly in economic and political development compared to other developing coun-
tries. Its role is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.3. It can be observed that, on
average, countries from the North sign most PTAs compared to countries from the
South and that Sub-Sahara African countries on average sign less PTAs than other
developing countries. Furthermore, the figure shows that for North and South most
of the PTAs were signed since 1990. Only for SSA this trend is not identifiable.
For a developing country (excluding SSA), about half of the signed PTAs is with a
country from the North. This reveals that N-S PTAs depict a substantial part of
PTAs for the South.
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For the depth of a PTA, the additive depth index from DESTA is used.4 The
index consists of seven subordinate variables, which take values of either zero or
one. The first variable takes the value one, if the agreement is more than a partial
scope, i.e. if the agreement is a full free trade agreement and zero otherwise. The
other six variables indicate whether the agreements contain substantive provisions
in the areas (1) services, (2) investments, (3) standards, (4) public procurement, (5)
competition and (6) intellectual property rights by a value of one or zero if this is
not the case. So if an agreement includes substantive provisions in all areas and
foresees the elimination of all tariffs, the value for the depth index adds up to seven.
Since there are many countries, which have signed several PTAs per year, the mean
of the depth index is calculated for each year.
Figure 4: Mean Depth by region over all PTAs included in DESTA (since
1948) and over all PTAs signed since 1990
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Figure 4 shows, again for North, South and SSA, the mean depth of signed PTAs
since 1948 (dark blue bar), since 1990 (light blue bar) and of N-S PTAs since 1948
(mid blue bar). It reflects that, on average, PTAs signed after 1990 are deeper
compared to all PTAs signed since 1948. But this is only the case for North and
4DESTA also provides a second measure of depth, using a latent trait analysis, which was
conducted for binary data. As in the following analysis binary data is not used, the additive index
is applied as a measure of depth
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South but not for countries in SSA. Furthermore, N-S PTAs are, on average, deeper
compared to other PTAs. Especially, when looking a countries from the South,
agreements signed with the North are distinctly deeper, with an average index of
almost 4, than the average depth index of all agreements signed since 1948, which
takes a value slightly above 2. This suggests that potential effects of deep trade
agreements are expected to be present especially in N-S PTAs.
3.1.3 Further controls
Further explanatory variables are the number of armed conflicts, freedom of the
press, income, population, inflation and education. These controls are relevant in
this context and have been investigated in related empirical studies.
Conflicts are expected to affect institutions negatively. To measure conflicts, the
UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence data set from the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCDP) and the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Re-
search Institute in Oslo (PRIO) is used. This data set is a country-year version of
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict data set v.4-2014, which is structured for a quan-
titative analysis. For this analysis, I use a variable, which measures the incidence of
at least one active intrastate conflict as a dummy for each country-year. Intra-state
conflicts refer to all conflicts between a government and a non-governmental party
without intervention from other countries, which result in no less then 25 battle-
related deaths per year.
Data on the press freedom is taken from Freedom House. It measures the degree of
press freedom in three categories, i.e. no press freedom (taking the value 0), partly
free (taking the value 1) or completely free (taking the value 2). I expect that a
higher press freedom positively affects the level of institutional quality as it can
reveal bad institutions and inform the public about missing rules or the violation of
rules and how institutions can be improved.
For income, education and population, I use data from the World Bank. Income
is measured as the log of GDP per capita in current US dollars. Data is available
for the period between 1960 and 2015 for 217 countries (World Bank, 2016). For
income, I expect a positive effect on institutions as with a higher available income,
people demand better institutions, and at the same time, more financial resources
are available to build them up.
Population is measured by the size of a country, which I measure as the total num-
ber of people in million for each country. The effects on institutional quality are
ambiguous. On the one hand, in a larger country it might be more likely to push
through reforms and necessary rules, as it has a critical financial mass. On the other
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hand, a larger population increases transaction costs and ethnic conflicts might be
more intensive, which constitutes a burden on the ability to promote institutions.
Years of schooling are used as a proxy for education. I expect a positive effect on
the quality of institutions, since a well-educated population has a higher interest in
political participation and reform and will demand good institutions.
3.2 Estimation Framework
The final data set includes 123 countries, 101 Southern and 22 Northern countries,
over 8 periods starting from 1984 until 2015. To analyze long term effects and to
reduce business cycle effects, 4-year averages are used. For the estimation framework,
I stick closely to the related empirical literature analyzing the effects on institutions.
I estimate the effect of the number of PTAs and the depth of PTAs on the quality of
institutions in a linear dynamic panel model using the following baseline equation:
INSTit = β1INSTi,t−1 + β2PTAsi,t−1 + β3Depthi,t−1 + β4PTAsi,t−1 ∗Depthi,t−1
+ γ′Xit + δt + µi + εit (1)
The dependent variable, INSTit, measures the quality of institutions of country i
in period t. A lagged dependent variable, INSTi,t−1, is included to capture the
persistence of institutional quality since only small adjustments are possible in one
period and a process of adaption is needed to implement better institutions. That
is, if the quality of institutions is low in the former period, a country will not be
able to improve institutions to a high level immediately in the next period.
The main explanatory variables are PTAsit, indicating the cumulative number of
trade agreements, which a country has signed until period t and Depthit, measuring
the mean depth of all agreements signed until period t. Furthermore, an interaction
term of the two variables PTAsit×Depthit is included to test if the effect of one of
the variables differs if the value of the other one changes. It could be, for example,
that the more trade agreements a country has signed, the larger or smaller the effect
of depth might be. Similarly, the deeper trade agreements are, the greater might
be the effects of the number of signed PTAs. Xit includes a number of time-varying
control variables, which are commonly used in the literature as determinants of insti-
tutional change. µi represents individual specific effects (here country fixed effects)
and δt denotes time dummies for all periods. Finally it is the idiosyncratic error
term, capturing all other omitted factors.
Estimating this equation using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) will lead to bi-
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ased results as the lagged dependent variable correlates with the individual specific
effect, which is part of the error term, i.e. E(µi|Yit−1) 6= 0 which is referred to as the
”dynamic panel bias” or ”Nickell-bias” (Nickell, 1981). This makes OLS inconsistent
and leads to an upward bias in the coefficients. Furthermore, results are biased due
to other endogenous variables.
Most explanatory variables are likely to be endogenous. There are two potential
sources of endogeneity. First, endogeneity may arise from omitted variables bias.
The inclusion of country fixed effects deals with this source of endogeneity. Sec-
ond, endogeneity arises due to simultaneity. The number of PTAs is potentially
endogenous with respect to β1 and β2 because of reverse causality arising from the
quality of institutions, which are not only affected by the number of PTAs but,
which might affect the number of PTAs itself. North countries might want to sign
more PTAs with countries, which have a higher level of institutional quality. This
problem of reverse causality might also occur with respect to the depth of PTAs
since the level of institutional quality in the South might affect how deep a PTA is.
If institutions are poor in the Southern country, a trading partner from the North
may seek to compensate for missing institutions by forming a deeper PTA to protect
domestic firms. The other control variables, namely income, freedom of the press
and conflicts are also expected to be endogenous due to simultaneity. Obviously,
if institutions are poor and there are no rules defined which secure (physical and
intellectual) property, this also produces a risk to the freedom of the press and may
also result in conflicts.
Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that institutions are a source of economic growth. In
endogenous growth models it is the amount of resources allocated to innovation,
which explains differences in income. Innovation activities highly depend on prop-
erty rights. If property rights for the technology of the innovation are not secured,
there are no incentives for innovation.5 And if there are secure property rights,
this depends on the implemented institutions. So institutions also affect income.
Empirical evidence for a causal relationship of institutions on growth is provided,
for example by Dollar and Kraay (2003), Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and
Shleifer (2004) and Levine (2005).
Education and population are assumed to be exogenous. Education is not expected
to be endogenous because the current level of institutions may only affect the educa-
tional system of future periods and then primarily the part of pupils, newly entering
school but less those who are already enrolled in school and it should not have any
5See also North (1990) for a detailed discussion of the importance of institutions for economic
development.
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effect on the current educational system.6
The difference generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimator, proposed by Holtz-
Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) as well as the system
GMM, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) ad-
dress the above noted problems. The estimator is constructed for linear dynamic
panel equations with a small number of periods and a large number of individuals,
a dynamic dependent variable, which is influenced by its past values, further en-
dogenous explanatory variables, fixed individual effects and heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation within individuals but not across them (Arellano & Bover, 1995;
Blundell & Bond, 1998). Furthermore, it is assumed that the only instruments
available are internal, i.e. they are based on lags of the instrumented variables.
This is an important characteristic as it appears to be very difficult to find suitable
instruments for endogenous variables from outside the model. These instruments
have to be highly correlated with the endogenous variables, but at the same time,
they need to be uncorrelated with the quality of institutions and to vary over time.
The model to be estimated takes the following general form of an autoregressive
panel data model, which is used to explain the estimation framework:
yit = αyi,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + ζXit + µi + εit (2)
The basic idea which is incorporated in the difference GMM is to remove the indi-
vidual fixed effects and thus the potential for omitted variable bias by taking first
differences as in equation (3). By this transformation, the lagged dependent vari-
able ∆yi,t−1 = yi,t−1 − yi,t−2 is still related to the error term ∆εit = εit − εi,t−1 via
the terms yi,t−1 and εi,t−1 and thus needs to be instrumented. But now ∆yi,t−2 and
yi,t−2 become valid instruments, which are related to the lagged dependent variable
but not to the error term as long as the errors are not serially correlated. Other
explanatory variables also remain endogenous and need to be instrumented by their
lags. After instrumenting, the transformed equation can be estimated using GMM.
∆yit = α∆yi,t−1 + γ∆Xi,t−1 + ζ∆Xit + ∆µi + ∆εit (3)
This estimation is performed by creating a system of equations of moment conditions
as in equation (4), which indicates that all instruments are uncorrelated with the
errors. With z being a vector of j instruments, there is a system of equations equal
to the number of instruments.
6For example, the German schooling system had a reform, where pupils could earn the diploma
”Abitur” after 12 years instead of 13 years. But this affected only pupils newly entering high school
and it took at least another 8 years until the first students graduated (Huebner & Marcus, 2017).
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E(ε|z) = 0 (4)
If there are more instruments, i.e. more equations than parameters to be estimated,
in general, there is no solution. The system is over-identified and usually all mo-
ment conditions cannot be satisfied. The GMM estimator now estimates equation
(3) by minimizing the vector EN(zε) of N observations, that is, forcing the em-
pirical moments as close to zero as possible. For this minimization problem, the
one-step GMM estimator defines a weighting matrix, which weighs each moment
condition. That means, in the optimal case, large weights are provided to moments
with small variances, while instruments with large variances are deemphasized by
smaller weights. Through this procedure, the information from instruments with
relatively small variances is not lost. In infinite samples the GMM estimator is con-
sistent and efficient.7 So when N increases the weighting matrix converges to the
optimal matrix. But as the sample size is limited, the instruments are expected to
correlate at least slightly with the endogenous part of the regressors. So in a finite
sample it is crucial not to include too many instruments.
Estimating GMM using a second step can lead to a gain in precision. The two step
GMM estimator uses the estimated residuals from the first step to create a covari-
ance matrix of estimated residuals and then does the GMM estimation again. In
difference GMM, two step GMM generally leads to lower bias and lower standard
errors compared to one step GMM. But in small samples, the two step estimator
can produce severely downward biased standard errors, which indicate a decep-
tive precision. This is due to the second step, where the efficient weight matrix
is constructed using parameter estimates without accounting for their variability.
Windmeijer (2005) derives a small-sample correction term, which corrects for the
extra variation in a small sample.
Blundell and Bond (1998) find that in small samples, which include a persistent
and short time-series the results of the difference GMM contain a small sample bias
and lose precision. As already suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995), one rea-
son is that lagged levels incorporate little information about future changes if the
dependent variable is close to a random walk and thus lagged levels are poor instru-
ments for differenced endogenous regressors. They are the first to propose the use
of lagged differenced instruments for the levels equation. Blundell and Bond (1998)
show that additional moment conditions for the levels equation, which create a sys-
tem of equations, contain information even when data is persistent and instruments
for the first-difference transformed equation are poor. They formalize necessary
7See Hansen (1982).
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assumptions to instrument endogenous variables in the levels equation. The ad-
ditional moment conditions indicate that changes in any instrumenting variable z
are orthogonal to the individual specific effects µi: E(∆zit|µi) = 0. As long as the
εit are not serially correlated ∆zi,t−1 = zi,t−1 − zi,t−2 can be used as an instrument
for the endogenous variable zi,t−1, which does not correlate with the idiosyncratic
error εit in the levels equation. As the levels equation still includes fixed effects,
the assumption that the change in the instrumenting variable ∆zi is orthogonal to
the fixed effects, µi, is not obvious. But Blundell and Bond (1998) show that under
certain conditions this assumption is satisfied. They show that the initial conditions
process of the data, generating the dependent variable, is crucial. In the long run,
based on µi, the initial value of a dependent variable y in a simple auto-regressive
model, where the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is smaller than 1, yi1
converges to µi/(1 − α) with εit indicating the deviation from this long-run level:
yi1 = µi/(1 − α) + εit. Then, the necessary assumption is fulfilled if the deviation
from the long-run level is not correlated with the level itself. In other words, the
assumption holds if the original series have a constant correlation over time with the
individual specific effects, also referred to as the ”mean stationarity” assumption.
However, the performance is reduced if the coefficient of the lagged dependent vari-
able approaches unity. When the constant correlation assumption is violated, taking
first differences does not completely remove the unobserved individual-specific ef-
fect and lagged differenced instruments for the levels equation will not be exogenous
anymore. As a result, the system GMM will not be valid anymore. In general, the
Sargan or Hansen test statistic provide information on the validity of used instru-
ments. Details on the appropriate range, which suggest the validity of instruments
are given in the following chapter, where the results are discussed.
Using system GMM, the two-step estimator is, in general, more efficient than one-
step, when Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors are applied. Then the stan-
dard covariance matrix is robust to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroscedas-
ticity. Taking the efficiency gains of the system GMM into account, the two-step
system GMM is used for the analysis. In the two-step GMM estimates, the Wind-
meijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors is employed. To test ap-
propriate lags as instruments for each endogenous variable, first stage regressions
were implemented for all endogenous variables and lags. All results are presented in
the following section.
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3.3 Results
A useful check for the GMM estimation are the estimation results from OLS and
within transformation, which can be interpreted as a bound for the true estimate
of the lagged dependent variable (Bond, 2002). While the OLS estimate is upward
biased, the estimate resulting from the within transformation is downward biased
as it does not remove the dynamic panel bias completely. As the within transforma-
tion subtracts the mean of each variable over all periods, the transformed terms still
include parts of the lagged dependent variable, which are correlated with the error
term. The true parameter estimates should lie within the range of the coefficients
of OLS and the within transformation.
Table 2: Comparison of system GMM results with OLS and FE
(1) (2) (3)
OLS FE sysGMM
INST (t-1) 0.492∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.035) (0.062)
Ln(Population) 0.053 -0.426 0.099
(0.034) (0.438) (0.082)
Ln(GDPpc) 0.367∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.294) (0.140)
Press Freedom 0.216∗∗∗ 0.009 0.156
(0.070) (0.164) (0.197)
Conflicts -0.257∗ -0.193 -0.490
(0.149) (0.328) (0.438)
Education -0.006 -0.004 -0.010
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Obs. 493 493 493
Countries 87 87
No. Instruments 77
Lags t-3, t-4, t-5
AB(2) p-value 0.021
AB(3) p-value 0.944
Hansen p-value 0.227
(i) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(ii) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted
by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
(iii) All models include year fixed effects.
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In a first step, the quality of institutions is regressed on the lagged dependent vari-
able and the main controls, which earlier empirical studies proved to be significant
determinants of institutions, namely, the natural logarithm of population, the nat-
ural logarithm of GDP per capita (income), press freedom, conflicts and education.
I implement three different estimations using the OLS estimator (OLS), the within
estimator (FE) and the system GMM estimator (sysGMM). The results are reported
in table 2.
The estimate of the lagged dependent variable, 0.433, lies within the bound of the
OLS and FE (0.492 and 0.293, respectively) and is significant at the one percent
level. So system GMM can be applied as a consistent and efficient estimator.
While first order serial correlation in differenced residuals is expected, as ∆εi,t =
εi,t−εi,t−1 and ∆εi,t−1 = εi,t−1−εi,t−2 both contain εi,t−1, the p-value of the Arellano-
Bond test of second order serial correlation in differences, AB(2) p-value, of 0.021
shows that there is also second order serial correlation. That is, ∆εi,t correlates
with ∆εi,t−2, which indicates first-order correlation in levels as these terms show the
relationship between εi,t−1 and εi,t−2. This makes the first lag inappropriate as an
instrument since the first lag is now endogenous.
Table 3 presents the first estimations of system GMM, where PTAs and depth of
PTAs is included. The Hansen p-value, which is reported in every column, is used
to assess the applied set of instruments. It indicates if the applied instruments are
valid. If a model is over-identified, which means that too many instruments are
included, the test will show unreliably high p-values. Such high values reveal a very
good instrument set by mistake, since the test is weakened by too many instruments.
One has to be cautious if the p-value becomes too large, while on the other hand too
small values would indicate that instruments are invalid. Roodman (2009) suggests,
one should be cautious about values below 0.1 and values well above 0.25. Although
this does not constitute a strict threshold, it provides a range of reference.
Table 3 presents the results when the number of PTAs of the previous period (PTAs
(t-1)) and depth of PTAs signed in the previous period (Depth (t-1)) are included
separately in model (1) and (2) and together in the third model and, finally, when
both variables are interacted in the forth model. In the first regression, lag 4 is used
for instrumenting, which leads to a p-value of 0.173 and a suitable set of instruments.
If lag 3 is used for this estimation, the Hansen p-value becomes (0.095), which gives
rise for invalid instruments. In models (2) to (4) lag three is used for instrumenting.
In all regressions of table 3 instruments are uncollapsed.8 Even when the instruments
8In section 3.3.3 the estimates of the main significant variables, for which conclusions are drawn,
are presented when also using different lag structures as instruments and when all instruments are
collapsed, to test whether the results are robust to different sets of instruments.
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Table 3: Two-step system GMM regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INST (t-1) 0.364∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.095) (0.084) (0.067)
Ln(Population) 0.138∗ 0.151∗ 0.116 0.107
(0.082) (0.082) (0.078) (0.071)
Ln(GDPpc) 0.583∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.201) (0.153) (0.165)
Press Freedom 0.424∗ -0.040 0.217 0.108
(0.245) (0.200) (0.245) (0.229)
Conflicts -0.735 -0.647 -0.329 -0.232
(0.596) (0.564) (0.515) (0.447)
Education -0.014 -0.007 -0.013 -0.007
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
PTAs (t-1) -0.024 -0.023 0.080
(0.026) (0.024) (0.091)
Depth (t-1) 0.151∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.046) (0.059)
PTAs(t-1)×Depth(t-1) -0.032
(0.028)
Obs. N 493 493 493 493
Countries 87 87 87 87
# Instruments 49 59 69 79
Lags t-4 t-3 t-3 t-3
AB(2) p-value 0.027 0.010 0.010 0.005
AB(3) p-value 0.990 0.915 0.948 0.882
Hansen p-value 0.173 0.225 0.204 0.216
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
(iii) All models include country and year fixed effects
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are collapsed, the significance levels of the variables in any regression reported in
table 3 remain basically the same. In model (2) Depth remains highly significant,
when instruments are collapsed. When Depth(t-1) is included together with PTAs in
column (3) the significance level of Depth(t-1) is reduced and in column (4), where
the interaction term is included, Depth(t-1) becomes insignificant.9 The Hansen
p-values reported in table 3 are within the range, which is not too close to 0.1
but still not too large, that is well above 0.25. The overall results show that the
depth of PTAs matters for institutions. That means higher levels of depth can lead
to better institutions, while the number of PTAs itself does not have any effect
on institutions. PTAs(t-1) is never significant, which indicates that changes in
the number of signed trade agreements do not significantly explain changes in the
institutional quality. That means, simply signing trade agreements does not help to
promote institutions.10
The other coefficients have the expected signs except for Education, which is neg-
ative and significant at the 5 percent level. PressFreedom is positive and signif-
icant only at the 10 percent level. All else equal, a one within standard deviation
(0.318) in the press freedom would lead to a 0.103 point increase in institutional
quality. Conflicts, is negative but also only significant at the 10 percent level. A
highly significant effect at the one percent level is shown by income, ln(GDPpc),
which positively affects the institutions. The effect is more than three times larger
compared to PressFreedom. A one within standard deviation (0.536) increase in
ln(GDPpc) would lead to a 0.332 increase in the institutional quality.
In the following regressions (columns (2) to (4)), when Depth(t-1) is included,
PressFreedom is no longer significant. Depth might absorb some of the variation
of the two variables. When Depth(t-1) is included without PTAs(t-1) in column
(2), it shows a positive effect on institutions, which is highly significant at the one
percent level. An increase of a one within standard deviation (1.411) of Depth(t-1)
would lead to a 0.213 point increase in the level of institutional quality. When the
number of trade agreements and depth are both included, PTAs(t-1) still does not
show any effect on the quality of institutions and, although the significance level
9The results where, for each model, instruments are collapsed is reported in the Appendix (table
A.4).
10I also checked for different ranges of the number of signed PTAs. That means, one can
argue that the first 5 or 10 PTAs may affect institutions but there might be a threshold where
an additional PTA might not have any significant effect anymore. In other words, signing an
additional 11th or 21st PTAs may not have the same effect as signing the first, 5th or 10th PTA. I
test for this by interacting the number of PTAs with dummy variables for having signed PTAs of
the following ranges: one PTA, between 2 and 5 PTAs, between 6 and 10 PTAs, between 11 and
20 and between 21 and 30 PTAs. The results do not show any significant effect. So there is no
evidence that there is a threshold for the number signed PTAs.
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and the effect is reduced, the effect of depth is still positive and significant at the 5
percent level. The reduction in significance levels for depth and also for population,
which is not significant anymore, can be a result of the reduction in the degrees
of freedom due to additional regressors. In the final column, an interaction term
of PTAs and Depth is included additionally to analyze whether changes in PTAs
(Depth) influence the effect of Depth (PTAs) on institutions. The results do not
indicate a joint effect of depth and the number of trade agreements. The effect for
depth now becomes larger again and highly significant. Except for ln(GDPpc), all
other controls remain insignificant.
3.3.1 Check for heterogeneity of countries
So far, the regressions include all developing countries. But looking at different
country groups, it can be seen that SSA performs very poorly with respect to several
factors of development and institutions compared to other developing countries.
Figure 5: Investment profile and GDP per capita by region (2001-04)
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Source: Authors' calculations using ICRG and World Bank data.
Figure 5 shows the means of institutional quality and GDP per capita for the years
2001 to 2004 for SSA, compared to all other developing countries (South) without
SSA and developed countries (North). It shows the poor performance of SSA with
respect to institutions and income. Among the group of all developing countries,
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SSA lags behind, which constitutes a persistent situation, which does not change
in other periods covered in the sample. Furthermore, the same pattern can be
observed for all other dimensions of institutions of the ICRG data, like law and
order, corruption or government stability. With respect to GDP per capita, this
deficit is even more severe.
Table 4: Mean for main variables by region
Variable SSA South North
INST 6.552 7.601 9.340
Education 63.735 88.786 104.095
Conflicts 0.218 0.217 0.035
Press Freedom 0.659 1.097 1.978
GDPpc 991.536 7049.104 32556.290
Depth 1.983 1.965 2.584
PTAs 4.806 2.940 26.725
TIPs 2.554 0.860 3.339
This situation, of low income with a low level of institutions is not specific for
Sub-Sahara Africa, but it is the region with the highest density of the poorest
economies in the world. Better levels of institutional quality cannot be observed
for any developing country exhibiting as low per capita income levels as in SSA.
Because they have such poor institutions, it might be more difficult for a country
from SSA to implement reforms in general, as well as provisions of very deep trade
agreements.
Beside the bad economic situation, those countries have to deal with a lot of other
problems like intra- and interstate conflicts, diseases and bad infrastructure. Table
4 reveals that SSA performs poorer compared to other developing countries with
respect to factors, which are also included in this analysis. The Press Freedom is
distinctly lower than in other developing countries. A higher press freedom might
serve as a provider of information and as a control on government policies and
thus can also promote the successful implementation of policies. Low press freedom
instead impedes this positive effect. There is much lower school enrollment, while
the presence of conflicts is similarly large as the South without SSA. But in this
context, it should be pronounced that this variable does not provide information on
the intensity of conflicts.
Overall, this shows the poor performance of SSA and it can be expected that SSA
governments do not have the capacity to address all issues at once and even processes
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in general might be less efficient. Furthermore, a country needs to have some basic
rules implemented before other rules, which are included in a PTA, can be imple-
mented. Moreover SSA countries tend to sign a larger number of PTAs compared to
other developing countries. Until the final period of this data set, the mean number
of agreements signed by SSA countries lies above the average of other developing
countries. Up to period 5 the mean is even more than twice as large. Over the
whole period observed, on average a SSA country signs almost 5 trade agreements
while other developing countries on average sign three PTAs. So SSA seems to sign
relatively more PTAs, whereby this even might increase the burden on the national
institutions to implement the agreements properly. Following these considerations, I
expect, that the effects of Depth (t-1) and PTAs(t-1) are different for SSA countries.
Table 5: Effects of PTAs and Depth for different country groupings
(1)
PTAs w/o SSA (t-1) -0.041
(0.037)
Depth w/o SSA (t-1) 0.181∗∗∗
(0.051)
PTAs SSA (t-1) 0.258∗∗
(0.111)
Depth SSA (t-1) -0.310
(0.295)
Obs. N 595
Countries 90
# Instruments 32
Lags t-3, t-4
AB(2) p-value 0.001
AB(3) p-value 0.749
Hansen p-value 0.157
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) All models include country and year fixed effects.
(iii) Instruments are collapsed.
(iv) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted
by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
Table 5 reports the results of a regression, where PTAs(t-1) and Depth(t-1) are now
interacted with dummies, indicating SSA countries (PTAs SSA (t-1), Depth SSA
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(t-1)) and all other developing countries without SSA (PTAs w/o SSA (t-1), Depth
w/o SSA (t-1)), respectively. All other control variables (except for Education) are
included but not shown.11 Education is not significant in any regression where Depth
(t-1) and PTAs (t-1) are included. To have more observations education is excluded.
Due to the additionally included interaction terms, which need to be instrumented,
all instruments are collapsed to avoid a too high instruments count, which would
lead to too large p-values for the Hansen test statistic.
For developing countries without SSA, it can be seen that the positive effect of depth
becomes larger compared to the effect of all developing countries including SSA and
it is significant at the one percent level. A one within standard deviation increase
in the depth index now leads to an increase in the institution index by 0.254 points.
The effect of the number of signed PTAs for this group remains insignificant. For
SSA, the effect of depth is not significant, while the effect of the number of signed
PTAs now becomes positive and significant at the 5 percent level. This supports the
argument that even if those countries sign deep PTAs, they are not able to implement
them effectively. On the other hand, for all other developing countries without
SSA the positive effect of deep trade agreements becomes even larger compared to
regressions when SSA is included. While for SSA simply signing trade agreements
has an effect, this supports the argument that simply joining networks with trading
partners has a positive effect in these countries. Finally, it should be noted that
the different effects, when SSA is excluded, do not only result from an overall lower
institutional quality related to SSA but other factors related to SSA must play a
role. I also check, whether the effects of PTAs(t-1) and Depth(t-1) for all developing
countries differ with regard to different levels of institutional quality. For this, I
perform regressions, where PTAs(t-1) and Depth(t-1) are interacted with a dummy
for having an institutional quality index larger (smaller) than 5, 7 or 8 but this
interaction term never becomes significant.
3.3.2 Check for heterogeneity of agreements
At this point all types of PTAs are included, which have the potential to liberalize
trade in any form. This includes partial scope agreements as well as full free trade
agreements.
Besides the number of PTAs, signatures of (bilateral) investment treaties have in-
creased, especially in the course of the 1990s. The main motive to sign investment
treaties is to protect foreign investment. This is why developed countries were the
initiators of those agreements. They are typically exporting capital into developing
11For detailed results including all control variables see in the Appendix (table A.5).
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countries where the legal system usually is less developed and standards are lower
compared to the laws, that investors are used to rely on in their domestic country.
By the means of an investment treaty, countries can set additional legal standards,
which are missing in the host country. This protects the domestic investors, while,
for the developing country, this will promote investment inflows, which are beneficial
for development. Consequently, investment treaties might play an important role in
developing the legal institutions in a developing country and it should be analyzed
at this point if treaties, including essential provisions with regard to investment,
are the driving factor in promoting institutions or, if the effect does not differ from
other PTAs.
To address this question, a new variable, TIPs(t−1), is included. For each country
and year, it sums up all signed treaties with investment provisions (TIPs). This
means, that these agreements include a chapter with substantive provisions in in-
vestment. Now the variable Depth (t-1) changes to Depth w/o IP (t-1) as this depth
index now does not include investment provisions (IPs). Depth w/o IP (t-1) now
only varies from 0 to 6 instead of a range from 0 to 7. For each of the provisions,
which are covered in the six areas intellectual property rights (IPRS), procurement,
standards, services or competition a value of one is added. So, if an agreement
includes provisions in all areas a depth index of 6 is assigned. PTAs w/o IP (t-1)
similarly now only includes PTAs without any provisions in investment.
The results are presented in table 6. Now only the third lag is used as an instru-
ment and the instruments are collapsed to avoid too large Hansen p-values. The
first column shows that, when TIPs are considered separately, the number of trade
agreements signed without investment provisions becomes negative and significant.
A one standard deviation increase in PTAs w/o IP (t-1) leads to a 1.038 point
reduction in the quality of institutions. This value is relatively large compared to
the effects from previous regressions. An explanation for this negative effect can be
that the effort, dedicated to the signature of PTAs, might reduce the efficiency of
government policies with regard to other areas such as investment. Furthermore,
the significant, positive effect of depth now disappears. This means that the provi-
sions in areas, like intellectual property rights or standards do not affect institutions,
while trade agreements containing investment provisions seem to play a crucial role.
The effect is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. Now also PressFreedom
has a positive and significant effect. All else equal, an increase in one within stan-
dard deviation of the PressFreedom (0.318)results in an increase of 0.516 points
in institutions. The effect of TIPs (t-1) is only slightly smaller with a 0.458 points
increase due to a one within standard deviation increase (1.483), but larger than
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Table 6: Effects for agreements with and without investment provisions
(IPs)
(1) (2)
INST (t-1) -0.440∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.113)
Ln(Population) -0.022 0.034
(0.139) (0.146)
Ln(GDPpc) 0.586∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.233)
Press Freedom 1.622∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗
(0.557) (0.592)
Conflicts 2.575 2.615
(1.665) (1.632)
PTAs w/o IP (t-1) -0.206∗∗∗ -0.072
(0.067) (0.224)
Depth w/o IP (t-1) 0.035 0.048
(0.127) (0.134)
PTAs w/o IP × Depth w/o IP (t-1) -0.043
(0.072)
TIPs (t-1) 0.309∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.115)
Obs. N 595 595
Countries 90 90
# Instruments 22 24
Lags t-3 t-3
AB(2) p-value 0.082 0.056
AB(3) p-value 0.514 0.557
Hansen p-value 0.136 0.224
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) All models include country and year fixed effects.
(iii) Instruments are collapsed.
(iv) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
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the effect of ln(GDPpc), where an increase of one within standard deviation (0.536)
leads to an increase of 0.314 in the institutional quality. Conflicts and Population
do not show a significant effect on institutions.
Column (2) shows that PTAs and depth are independent. The included interaction
term of PTAs w/o IP (t-1) and Depth w/o IP (t-1) is not significant.
The same regression as in column (1) is done with PTAs w/o IP (t-1), Depth w/o IP
(t-1) and TIPs (t-1) being interacted with dummies for SSA and all other developing
countries without SSA. The respective results are presented in table 7.
Table 7: Effects for agreements with and without investment provisions
for SSA and without SSA
(1)
PTAs w/o IP (t-1)× no SSA -0.195∗∗∗
(0.064)
Depth w/o IP (t-1)× no SSA 0.145
(0.112)
TIPs (t-1)× no SSA 0.316∗∗∗
(0.113)
PTAs w/o IP (t-1)× SSA 0.297
(0.379)
Depth w/o IP (t-1)× SSA 0.142
(0.437)
TIPs (t-1)× SSA -0.131
(0.374)
Obs. N 595
Countries 90
# Instruments 28
Lags t-3
AB(2) p-value 0.019
AB(3) p-value 0.702
Hansen p-value 0.402
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) All models include country and year fixed effects.
(iii) Instruments are collapsed.
(iv) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
A problem, which arises here, is that the inclusion of another control variable,
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TIPs(t − 1), and additional interaction terms lead to an increase in the instru-
ment count. To reduce the number of instruments, only the third lag is used and
the instruments are collapsed. Again, all other control variables are included with
the exception of Education.12
For countries from SSA, distinguishing between different types of agreements, leads
to insignificant effects. Signing PTAs with or without investment provisions does not
show an effect on institutions. The depth of PTAs without investment provisions, as
in previous regressions, where investment chapters are included, is not significant.
But for all other developing countries without SSA the positive effect of TIPs in-
creases slightly. Now a one standard deviation increase in TIPs(t− 1) (1.719) leads
to an increase in institutions by 0.543 points. The negative effect of PTAs without
investment provisions also becomes larger. A one within standard deviation increase
amounts to a 1.144 point reduction in the institutions index. This is an important
result, which suggests that the negative effect of signing a large number of PTAs is
more severe than the positive effect, which results from the number of TIPs. So the
overall effects, when differentiated between the type of trade agreement, again show
different results when SSA is excluded.
3.3.3 Check for robustness of instruments
As discussed in chapter 3.2, using system GMM raises the risk of instrument pro-
liferation, which causes the Hansen test to show implausibly high p-values close to
one and thus fails to indicate that the model is over-fitted due to a high number of
instruments, resulting in too small standard errors. Consequently, using different
lag structures can affect the results.
To show how the results develop for Depth (t-1) and TIPs (t-1) using different
numbers of lags as instruments, figure 6 shows the parameter estimates for both
variables (graphs on the left) and when interacted with a dummy for the South
without SSA Depth w/o SSA (t-1) and TIPs w/o SSA(t-1), respectively on the
right) using different lag lengths as instruments.
The estimates for Depth (t-1) and Depth w/o SSA (t-1) are based on the results
presented in table 3 column (3) and table 5. The estimates for TIPs (t-1) and
TIPs w/o SSA(t-1) are based on the regressions shown in the first column of table 6
and in table 7, respectively. The solid lines indicate the parameter estimates, while
the dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals (CIs). The estimate for
Depth (t-1) is obtained from the same model as reported in table 2, column (3). At
12A table with the respective results with all included explanatory variables is included in the
Appendix (table A.6).
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Figure 6: Robustness of estimates to different lags as instruments
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the very left point of the solid line Depth (t-1) is instrumented with the difference
lagged by three periods, now with collapsed instruments. Moving from here to the
right along the solid line, an additional lagged difference is included in the set of
instruments, up to a total of differences, lagged by 8 periods. The estimate for Depth
(t-1) varies more, relative to uncollapsed instruments. But when instruments are
uncollapsed, including more than one lag leads to an increase instruments, leading
to a suspiciously large Hansen p-value. The parameter estimates become smaller
the more lags are included. It varies from 0.140 when only lag 3 is used, leading to
a number of 21 instruments, to 0.065 when lags 3 to 8 are used, which leads to 45
instruments in total. Moreover, the estimates are not significant anymore when lags
6 and longer are included.
The estimate Depth w/o SSA (t-1), shown in table 4, depicts the point on the solid
line at lag depth 4 in the top right graph, where differences lagged by period 3 and
4 are included in the instrument set. At lag depth 8 all periods from 3 to 8 are used
as instruments. The estimates of Depth w/o SSA (t-1) vary only little and remain
relatively stable. It ranges from 0.186, when only lag 3 is used, to 0.126, when all
lags are used, starting in period 3 and leading to a total number of 36 instruments.
The effect remains highly significant at the 1 percent level, independent of the lag
length.
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The estimates of TIPs (t-1) and TIPs w/o SSA(t-1), presented in table 5 colum (1)
and in table 6, depict the starting point of the solid line at lag length 3. So the
estimation results, which I report above, are already very conservative with respect
to the set of instruments since the minimum number of instruments is included.
Increasing the lag length from 3 to 5 periods, the estimates for TIPs (t-1) and
TIPs w/o SSA(t-1) reduce by more than 0.1 points, but then remain stable and
significant, independent from the lag length used for the instrument set.
4 Conclusion
The phenomenon of the increase in signature rates of trade agreements since the
1990s, has experienced a lot of attention in the academic research. A substantial
part of the agreements is between developing and developed countries i.e. between
North and South (N-S). Almost simultaneously, the content of trade agreements has
changed. PTAs have become deeper. They distinctly exceed regulations from the
WTO. PTAs more and more specify political cooperation and include ”behind-the-
border” rules in different areas such as investment, intellectual property, competition
policy or the rule of law. It can be observed that N-S PTAs on average are deeper
compared to other types of PTAs, i.e. North-North and South-South PTAs. This
development is one result of missing or poor institutions in developing countries
trading with developed countries, where firms can do business in a good institutional
environment.
This paper provides evidence on whether trade agreements can serve as a driver of
institutional quality in developing countries by accounting for the number of signed
PTAs as well as the depth of PTAs. I build the anaylsis on the comprehensive
DESTA database, including a very broad set of trade agreements and a measure
for the content of PTAs. I am specifically looking at the effects on the quality of
institutions with regard to investment, since these institutions play an important role
for trading firms and firms investing abroad. Rules affecting this type of institutions
are expected to be essential in trade agreements. I use a long panel to account for
the changes over time and to address endogeneity issues.
The results confirm that deep trade agreements have a positive effect on institu-
tions. But at the same time, the effects differ with regard to different regions. SSA
appears to play a specific role. Compared to other developing countries, in SSA
the economic and political performance is distinctly poorer. The results show that
signing deep PTAs does not have any effect on institutions in SSA. Focusing on de-
veloping countries excluding SSA, the positive effect of depth becomes even larger,
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compared to the effect when SSA is included, it is highly significant and robust to
different lag structures of instruments.
When looking at different types of trade agreements, investment treaties, i.e. those
agreements, including substantive investment provisions (TIPs), show to be the
important drivers of change in institutional quality. However, signing PTAs in
general has no effect. The positive effect of TIPs on institutions even exceeds the
overall effect of the deep PTAs. This effect, again, is not present for SSA, where the
signing of neither TIPs nor deep PTAs does have an effect on institutional quality.
These results reveal positive aspects of the increase in the number of signed N-
S trade agreements, especially those including investment provisions. It can be a
chance for developing countries to improve domestic institutions, which again has
a positive effect on the overall development of the country. However, it should be
emphasized, that the analysis focuses on specific institutions related to trade and
investment abroad. Besides, this paper has also highlights once more, the specific
role of SSA as a region of developing countries, which performs poorer relative to
other developing countries with regard to political and economic variables.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Description of variables and sources
Variable Description Source
INST Investment Profile, component
of the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG)
ICRG database by PRS Group
(2016)
PTAs Cumulative sum of the number
of signed trade agreements for
each country
Design of Trade Agreements
(DESTA) database by Du¨r,
Baccini and Elsig (2014)
Depth Average depth of all agreements
signed
Design of Trade Agreements
(DESTA) database by Du¨r,
Baccini and Elsig (2014)
TIPs Number of signed Treaties with
investment provisions
Authors calculations based on:
Design of Trade Agreements
(DESTA) database by Du¨r,
Baccini and Elsig (2014)
Education Gross enrollment ratio, primary
and secondary, both sexes (in
percent)
The World Bank (2016)
Conflicts Conflicts of intrastate conflict.
Coded 1 in all country-years
with at least one active conflict
The UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset: Gleditsch et
al. (2002); Allansson et al.
(2017)
Population Population (in million) The World Bank (2016)
Press Freedom Degree of the freedom of the
press, 0 (not free), 1 (partly
free), 2 (completely free)
Freedom House (2016)
GDPpc GDP per capita (current USD) The World Bank (2016)
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Table A.2: List of countries categorized as North or South
Northern countries Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States
Southern countries Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Rep. of Korea,
Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Lithuania, Madagascar,
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Moldova,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar,
Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian
Arab Republic, Taiwan, Province of China, Tanzania,
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
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Table A.3: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
INST overall 761 7.09 2.27 0.50 12.00
between 1.56 2.44 10.55
within 1.66 1.66 10.29
PTAs overall 792 3.18 3.33 0.00 33.50
between 2.49 0.03 15.03
within 2.23 -11.85 21.65
Depth overall 792 1.80 1.61 0.00 7.00
between 0.75 0.00 4.61
within 1.43 -2.81 6.51
TIPs overall 792 1.30 1.56 0.00 10.75
between 1.20 0.00 3.84
within 0.99 -1.94 8.81
Education overall 652 80.45 20.95 14.60 113.28
between 19.56 17.20 103.63
within 9.43 46.28 113.45
Conflicts overall 768 0.20 0.37 0.00 1.00
between 0.31 0.00 1.00
within 0.20 -0.58 1.05
Ln (Population) overall 783 16.01 1.66 12.33 21.03
between 1.66 12.55 20.93
within 0.21 15.13 17.06
Press Freedom overall 714 0.85 0.73 0.00 2.00
between 0.65 0.00 2.00
within 0.35 -0.55 1.85
Ln (GDPpc) overall 747 7.58 1.47 4.19 11.41
between 1.36 5.28 10.39
within 0.54 6.17 9.46
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Table A.4: Two-step system GMM regression results (baseline with collapsed
instruments)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
inv prof inv prof inv prof inv prof
INST (t-1) 0.314∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗
(0.169) (0.096) (0.108) (0.128)
Ln(Population) 0.206 0.079 -0.033 -0.012
(0.177) (0.080) (0.091) (0.104)
Ln(GDPpc) 0.716∗∗ 0.442∗∗ 0.460∗∗ 0.381
(0.318) (0.200) (0.232) (0.268)
Press Freedom 0.245 0.320 0.592 0.955
(0.873) (0.410) (0.490) (0.659)
Conflicts -1.104 0.135 0.413 0.955
(2.226) (0.886) (1.017) (1.182)
Education -0.017 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
PTAs (t-1) -0.007 -0.028 -0.203
(0.060) (0.039) (0.128)
Depth (t-1) 0.200∗∗∗ 0.140∗ 0.074
(0.068) (0.071) (0.085)
PTAs(t-1)×depth(t-1) 0.057
(0.035)
Obs. N 493 493 474 474
Countries 87 87 86 86
# Instruments 19 19 21 23
Lags t-4 t-3 t-3 t-3
AB(2) p-value 0.098 0.008 0.019 0.096
AB(3) p-value 0.872 0.885 0.596 0.395
Hansen p-value 0.196 0.266 0.026 0.134
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) All models include country and year fixed effects.
(iii) Instruments are collapsed.
(iv) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
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Table A.5: Effects for Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) and all other Southern countries
without SSA (w/o SSA)
(1)
INST (t-1) 0.371∗∗∗
(0.084)
ln(Population) 0.096
(0.119)
ln(GDPpc) 0.667∗∗∗
(0.235)
Press Freedom 0.372
(0.303)
Conflicts 0.106
(1.005)
PTAs w/o SSA (t-1) -0.041
(0.037)
Depth w/o SSA (t-1) 0.181∗∗∗
(0.051)
PTA SSA (t-1) 0.258∗∗
(0.111)
Depth SSA (t-1) -0.310
(0.295)
Obs. N 595
Countries 90
# Instruments 32
Lags t-3, t-4
AB(2) p-value 0.001
AB(3) p-value 0.749
Hansen p-value 0.157
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) All models include country and year fixed effects.
(iii) Instruments are collapsed.
(iv) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
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Table A.6: Effects for agreements with and without investment provisions without
SSA and for SSA
(1)
INST (t-1) 0.423∗∗∗
(0.098)
ln(Population) -0.038
(0.133)
ln(GDPpc) 0.578∗
(0.301)
Press Freedom 1.199∗∗
(0.470)
Conflicts 2.577
(1.553)
PTAs w/o IP (t-1)×no SSA -0.195∗∗∗
(0.064)
Depth w/o IP (t-1)×no SSA 0.145
(0.112)
TIPs (t-1)×no SSA 0.316∗∗∗
(0.113)
PTAs w/o IP (t-1)×SSA 0.297
(0.379)
Depths w/o IP (t-1)×SSA -0.142
(0.437)
TIPs (t-1)×SSA -0.131
(0.374)
Obs. N 595
Countries 90
# Instruments 28
Lags t-3
AB(2) p-value 0.002
AB(3) p-value 0.667
Hansen p-value 0.189
Notes:
(i) Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) All models include country and year fixed effects.
(iii) Instruments are collapsed.
(iv) Significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is denoted by
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗, respectively.
43
Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences 
 
The Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences continues since 2015 the established “FZID Discussion 
Paper Series” of the “Centre for Research on Innovation and Services (FZID)” under the name “Hohenheim 
Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences”. 
 
Institutes 
 
510 Institute of Financial Management 
520 Institute of Economics 
530 Institute of Health Care & Public Management 
540 Institute of Communication Science 
550 Institute of Law and Social Sciences 
560 Institute of Economic and Business Education 
570 Institute of Marketing & Management 
580 Institute of Interorganizational Management & Performance 
 
Research Areas (since 2017) 
 
INEPA   “Inequality and Economic Policy Analysis” 
TKID   “Transformation der Kommunikation – Integration und Desintegration” 
NegoTrans  “Negotiation Research – Transformation, Technology, Media and Costs” 
INEF  “Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Finance” 
 
Download Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences  
from our homepage:  https://wiso.uni-hohenheim.de/papers 
 
 
 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
01-2015 Thomas Beissinger, 
Philipp Baudy 
THE IMPACT OF TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK  
ON TRADE UNION WAGE SETTING: 
A Theoretical Analysis 
 
520 
02-2015 Fabian Wahl 
 
PARTICIPATIVE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND  
CITY DEVELOPMENT 800-1800 
 
520 
03-2015 Tommaso Proietti, 
Martyna Marczak, 
Gianluigi Mazzi 
 
EUROMIND-D: A DENSITY ESTIMATE OF  
MONTHLY GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR  
THE EURO AREA 
520 
04-2015 Thomas Beissinger, 
Nathalie Chusseau, 
Joël Hellier 
 
OFFSHORING AND LABOUR MARKET REFORMS: 
MODELLING THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 
520 
05-2015 Matthias Mueller, 
Kristina Bogner, 
Tobias Buchmann, 
Muhamed Kudic 
 
SIMULATING KNOWLEDGE DIFFUSION IN FOUR 
STRUCTURALLY DISTINCT NETWORKS  
– AN AGENT-BASED SIMULATION MODEL 
520 
06-2015 Martyna Marczak, 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
BIDIRECTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND EXCESS RETURNS: 
NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE WAVELET PERSPECTIVE 
 
520 
07-2015 Peng Nie, 
Galit Nimrod, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
INTERNET USE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING  
IN CHINA 
530 
 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
08-2015 Fabian Wahl  
 
THE LONG SHADOW OF HISTORY 
ROMAN LEGACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
– EVIDENCE FROM THE GERMAN LIMES 
 
520 
09-2015 Peng Nie,  
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
COMMUTE TIME AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING IN 
URBAN CHINA 
530 
10-2015 Kristina Bogner 
 
THE EFFECT OF PROJECT FUNDING ON 
INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE  
AN AGENT-BASED SIMULATION MODEL 
 
520 
 
11-2015 Bogang Jun, 
Tai-Yoo Kim 
A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
ANALYTICAL MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK:  
THE EXPANDED REPRODUCTION SYSTEM 
 
520 
12-2015 Volker Grossmann 
Aderonke Osikominu 
Marius Osterfeld 
 
ARE SOCIOCULTURAL FACTORS IMPORTANT FOR 
STUDYING A SCIENCE UNIVERSITY MAJOR? 
520 
 
13-2015 Martyna Marczak 
Tommaso Proietti 
Stefano Grassi 
A DATA–CLEANING AUGMENTED KALMAN FILTER 
FOR ROBUST ESTIMATION OF STATE SPACE 
MODELS 
 
520 
14-2015 Carolina Castagnetti 
Luisa Rosti 
Marina Töpfer 
 
THE REVERSAL OF THE GENDER PAY GAP AMONG 
PUBLIC-CONTEST SELECTED YOUNG EMPLOYEES 
520 
15-2015 Alexander Opitz DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA: 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1905 AND THE POLITICAL 
STOCK MARKET 
 
520 
    
01-2016 Michael Ahlheim,  
Jan Neidhardt 
NON-TRADING BEHAVIOUR IN CHOICE 
EXPERIMENTS 
 
520 
02-2016 Bogang Jun,  
Alexander Gerybadze, 
Tai-Yoo Kim 
THE LEGACY OF FRIEDRICH LIST: THE EXPANSIVE 
REPRODUCTION SYSTEM AND THE KOREAN 
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIALIZATION 
 
520 
03-2016 Peng Nie,  
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
FOOD INSECURITY AMONG OLDER EUROPEANS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE SURVEY OF HEALTH, AGEING, 
AND RETIREMENT IN EUROPE 
 
530 
04-2016 Peter Spahn POPULATION GROWTH, SAVING, INTEREST RATES 
AND STAGNATION. DISCUSSING THE EGGERTSSON-
MEHROTRA-MODEL 
 
520 
05-2016 Vincent Dekker, 
Kristina Strohmaier, 
Nicole Bosch 
A DATA-DRIVEN PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE THE 
BUNCHING WINDOW – AN APPLICATION TO THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
520 
06-2016 Philipp Baudy, 
Dario Cords 
DEREGULATION OF TEMPORARY AGENCY 
EMPLOYMENT IN A UNIONIZED ECONOMY: DOES 
THIS REALLY LEAD TO A SUBSTITUTION OF 
REGULAR EMPLOYMENT? 
 
520 
 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
07-2016 Robin Jessen,  
Davud Rostam-Afschar, 
Sebastian Schmitz 
 
HOW IMPORTANT IS PRECAUTIONARY LABOR 
SUPPLY? 
520 
08-2016 Peng Nie, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Jianhong Xue 
 
FUEL FOR LIFE: DOMESTIC COOKING FUELS 
AND WOMEN’S HEALTH IN RURAL CHINA 
530 
09-2016 Bogang Jun, 
Seung Kyu-Yi, 
Tobias Buchmann, 
Matthias Müller 
 
THE CO-EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION 
NETWORKS: COLLABORATION BETWEEN WEST 
AND EAST GERMANY FROM 1972 TO 2014 
 
520 
10-2016 Vladan Ivanovic, 
Vadim Kufenko, 
Boris Begovic 
Nenad Stanisic, 
Vincent Geloso 
 
CONTINUITY UNDER A DIFFERENT NAME. 
THE OUTCOME OF PRIVATISATION IN SERBIA 
520 
11-2016 David E. Bloom 
Michael Kuhn 
Klaus Prettner 
 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF FEMALE HEALTH TO 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
520 
12-2016 Franz X. Hof 
Klaus Prettner 
 
THE QUEST FOR STATUS AND R&D-BASED 
GROWTH 
520 
13-2016 Jung-In Yeon 
Andreas Pyka 
Tai-Yoo Kim 
 
STRUCTURAL SHIFT AND INCREASING VARIETY 
IN KOREA, 1960–2010: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF 
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MODEL BY THE 
CREATION OF NEW SECTORS 
 
520 
14-2016 Benjamin Fuchs THE EFFECT OF TEENAGE EMPLOYMENT ON 
CHARACTER SKILLS, EXPECTATIONS AND 
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE STRATEGIES 
 
520 
15-2016 Seung-Kyu Yi 
Bogang Jun 
HAS THE GERMAN REUNIFICATION 
STRENGTHENED GERMANY’S NATIONAL 
INNOVATION SYSTEM? TRIPLE HELIX DYNAMICS 
OF GERMANY’S INNOVATION SYSTEM 
 
520 
16-2016 Gregor Pfeifer 
Fabian Wahl 
Martyna Marczak 
 
ILLUMINATING THE WORLD CUP EFFECT: NIGHT 
LIGHTS EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH AFRICA 
520 
17-2016 Malte Klein 
Andreas Sauer 
 
CELEBRATING 30 YEARS OF INNOVATION 
SYSTEM RESEARCH: WHAT YOU NEED TO 
KNOW ABOUT INNOVATION SYSTEMS 
 
570 
18-2016 Klaus Prettner THE IMPLICATIONS OF AUTOMATION FOR 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE LABOR SHARE 
 
520 
19-2016 Klaus Prettner 
Andreas Schaefer 
HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE FALL AND RISE 
OF INEQUALITY 
 
520 
20-2016 Vadim Kufenko 
Klaus Prettner 
YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT? 
ESTIMATOR CHOICE AND THE SPEED OF 
CONVERGENCE 
 
520 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
01-2017 Annarita Baldanzi 
Alberto Bucci 
Klaus Prettner 
 
CHILDRENS HEALTH, HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION, AND R&D-BASED ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
INEPA 
02-2017 Julius Tennert 
Marie Lambert 
Hans-Peter Burghof 
 
MORAL HAZARD IN VC-FINANCE: MORE 
EXPENSIVE THAN YOU THOUGHT  
INEF 
03-2017 Michael Ahlheim 
Oliver Frör 
Nguyen Minh Duc 
Antonia Rehl 
Ute Siepmann 
Pham Van Dinh 
 
LABOUR AS A UTILITY MEASURE 
RECONSIDERED 
520 
04-2017 Bohdan Kukharskyy 
Sebastian Seiffert 
GUN VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.: CORRELATES AND 
CAUSES 
 
520 
05-2017 Ana Abeliansky 
Klaus Prettner 
 
AUTOMATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 520 
06-2017 Vincent Geloso 
Vadim Kufenko 
 
INEQUALITY AND GUARD LABOR, OR 
PROHIBITION AND GUARD LABOR? 
INEPA 
07-2017 Emanuel Gasteiger 
Klaus Prettner 
ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AUTOMATION-INDUCED 
STAGNATION 
 
520 
08-2017 Klaus Prettner 
Holger Strulik 
THE LOST RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE: 
AUTOMATION, EDUCATION, AND INEQUALITY IN 
AN R&D-BASED GROWTH MODEL 
 
INEPA 
09-2017 David E. Bloom 
Simiao Chen 
Michael Kuhn 
Mark E. McGovern 
Les Oxley 
Klaus Prettner 
 
THE ECONOMIC BURDEN OF CHRONIC 
DISEASES: ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS FOR 
CHINA, JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA 
520 
10-2017 Sebastian Till Braun 
Nadja Dwenger 
THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT SHAPES REFUGEE 
INTEGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM POST-WAR 
GERMANY 
 
INEPA 
11-2017 Vadim Kufenko 
Klaus Prettner 
Vincent Geloso 
 
DIVERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND THE 
HISTORY-AUGMENTED SOLOW MODEL 
 
INEPA 
12-2017 Frank M. Fossen 
Ray Rees 
Davud Rostam-Afschar 
Viktor Steiner 
 
HOW DO ENTREPRENEURIAL PORTFOLIOS 
RESPOND TO INCOME TAXATION? 
520 
13-2017 Steffen Otterbach 
Michael Rogan 
SPATIAL DIFFERENCES IN STUNTING AND 
HOUSEHOLD AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: (RE-) EXAMINING THE LINKS 
USING NATIONAL PANEL SURVEY DATA 
 
INEPA 
14-2017 Carolina Castagnetti 
Luisa Rosti 
Marina Töpfer 
 
THE CONVERGENCE OF THE GENDER PAY GAP 
– AN ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION APPROACH 
INEPA 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
15-2017 Andreas Hecht ON THE DETERMINANTS OF SPECULATION – A 
CASE FOR EXTENDED DISCLOSURES IN 
CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
510 
16-2017 Mareike Schoop 
D. Marc Kilgour (Editors) 
 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON GROUP DECISION AND 
NEGOTIATION 
 
NegoTrans 
17-2017 Mareike Schoop 
D. Marc Kilgour (Editors) 
 
DOCTORAL CONSORTIUM OF THE 17TH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GROUP 
DECISION AND NEGOTIATION 
 
NegoTrans 
18-2017 Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer 
Fabian Wahl 
 
SAVING BANKS AND THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION IN PRUSSIA 
SUPPORTING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT WITH 
PUBLIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
520 
19-2017 Stephanie Glaser A REVIEW OF SPATIAL ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
FOR COUNT DATA 
 
520 
20-2017 Dario Cords ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGY, MATCHING, AND 
LABOUR UNIONS: DOES LOW-SKILLED 
IMMIGRATION AFFECT THE TECHNOLOGICAL 
ALIGNMENT OF THE HOST COUNTRY? 
 
INEPA 
21-2017 Micha Kaiser 
Jan M. Bauer 
PRESCHOOL CHILD CARE AND CHILD WELL-
BEING IN GERMANY: DOES THE MIGRANT 
EXPERIENCE DIFFER? 
 
INEPA 
22-2017 Thilo R. Huning 
Fabian Wahl 
LORD OF THE LEMONS: ORIGIN AND DYNAMICS 
OF STATE CAPACITY 
 
520 
23-2017 Matthias Busse 
Ceren Erdogan 
Henning Mühlen 
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND ITS 
RELEVANCE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SUB-
SHARAN AFRICA 
 
INEPA 
24-2017 Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer 
Alexander Opitz 
THE VALUE OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS IN THE 
FIRST GERMAN DEMOCRACY – EVIDENCE FROM 
THE BERLIN STOCK EXCHANGE 
 
520 
25-2017 Samuel Mburu 
Micha Kaiser 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
LIFESTOCK ASSET DYNAMICS AMONG 
PASTORALISTS IN NORTHERN KENYA 
INEPA 
26-2017 
 
Marina Töpfer DETAILED RIF DECOMPOSITION WITH 
SELECTION – THE GENDER PAY GAP IN ITALY 
 
INEPA 
27-2017 Robin Jessen 
Maria Metzing 
Davud Rostam-Afschar 
 
OPTIMAL TAXATION UNDER DIFFERENT 
CONCEPTS OF JUSTNESS 
INEPA 
28-2017 Alexander Kressner 
Katja Schimmelpfeng 
 
CLUSTERING SURGICAL PROCEDURES FOR 
MASTER SURGICAL SCHEDULING 
580 
29-2017 Clemens Lankisch 
Klaus Prettner 
Alexia Prskawetz 
 
ROBOTS AND THE SKILL PREMIUM: AN 
AUTOMATION-BASED EXPLANATION OF WAGE 
INEQUALITY 
INEPA 
 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
30-2017 Ann-Sophie Adelhelm 
Melanie Bathelt 
Mirjam Bathelt 
Bettina Bürkin 
Sascha Klein 
Sabrina Straub 
Lea Wagner 
Fabienne Walz 
 
ARBEITSWELT: DIGITAL – BELASTUNG: REAL? 
DER ERLEBTE WANDEL DER ARBEITSWELT 
INNERHALB DER IT-BRANCHE AUS SICHT DER 
ARBEITNEHMER 
550 
 
31-2017 Annarita Baldanzi 
Klaus Prettner 
Paul Tscheuschner 
LONGEVITY-INDUCED VERICAL INNOVATION 
AND THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN LIFE AND 
GROWTH 
 
520 
32-2017 Vincent Dekker 
Kristina Strohmaier 
THE EFFECT OF TRANSFER PRICING 
REGULATIONS ON INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE 
 
520 
    
01-2018 Michael D. Howard 
Johannes Kolb 
 
FOUNDER CEOS AND NEW VENTURE MEDIA 
COVERAGE 
INEF 
02-2018 Peter Spahn UNCONVENTIONAL VIEWS ON INFLATION 
CONTRAOL: FORWARD GUIDANCE, THE NEO-
FISHERIAN APPROACH, AND THE FISCAL 
THEORY OF THE PRICE LEVEL 
 
520 
03-2018 Aderonke Osikominu 
Gregor Pfeifer 
 
PERCEIVED WAGES AND THE GENDER GAP IN 
STEM FIELDS 
INEPA 
04-2018 Theresa Grafeneder-
Weissteiner 
Klaus Prettner 
Jens Südekum 
 
THREE PILLARS OF URBANIZATION: MIGRATION, 
AGING, AND GROWTH 
INEPA 
05-2018 Vadim Kufenko 
Vincent Geloso 
Klaus Prettner 
 
DOES SIZE MATTER? IMPLICATIONS OF 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND CONVERGENCE 
INEPA 
06-2018 Michael Trost THE WHOLE IS GREATER THAN THE SUM OF ITS 
PARTS – PRICING PRESSURE INDICES FOR 
MERGERS OF VERTICALLY INTEGRATED FIRMS 
 
520 
07-2018 Karsten Schweikert TESTING FOR COINTEGRATION WITH 
TRESHOLD ADJUSTMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF 
STRUCTURAL BREAKS 
 
520 
08-2018 Evanthia Fasoula 
Karsten Schweikert 
PRICE REGULATIONS AND PRICE ADJUSTMENT 
DYNAMICS: EVIDENCE FROM THE AUSTRIAN 
RETAIL FUEL MARKET 
 
520 
09-2018 Michael Ahlheim 
Jan Neidhardt 
Ute Siepmann 
Xiaomin Yu 
 
WECHAT – USING SOCIAL MEDIA FOR THE 
ASSESSMENT OF TOURIST PREFERENCES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS IN CHINA 
520 
 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
10-2018 Alexander Gerybadze 
Simone Wiesenauer 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALES ACCELERATOR: A 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR IMPROVING 
SALES PERFORMANCE IN FOREIGN TARGET 
MARKETS 
 
570 
11-2018 Klaus Prettner 
Niels Geiger 
Johannes Schwarzer 
 
DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN FOLGEN DER 
AUTOMATISIERUNG 
INEPA 
12-2018 Martyna Marczak 
Thomas Beissinger 
COMPETITIVENESS AT THE COUNTRY-SECTOR 
LEVEL: NEW MEASURES BASED ON GLOBAL 
VALUE CHAINS 
 
520 
13-2018 Niels Geiger 
Klaus Prettner 
Johannes Schwarzer 
 
AUTOMATISIERUNG, WACHSTUM UND 
UNGLEICHHEIT 
INEPA 
14-2018 Klaus Prettner 
Sebastian Seiffert 
THE SIZE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS AND 
EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES: THEORY AND 
EVIDENCE FROM THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT 
 
INEPA 
15-2018 Marina Töpfer THE EFFECT OF WOMEN DIRECTORS ON 
INNOVATION ACTIVITY AND PERFORMANCE OF 
CORPORATE FIRMS 
- EVIDENCE FROM CHINA – 
 
INEF 
16-2018 Timo Walter TRADE AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF A 
POTENTIAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
INEPA 
17-2018 Jonas Frank THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON 
TRADE: NEW EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL PPML 
GRAVITY APPROACH 
 
INEPA 
18-2018 Jonas Frank THE EFFECT OF CULTURE ON TRADE OVER 
TIME – NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE GLOBE DATA 
SET 
 
520 
19-2018 Dario Cords 
Klaus Prettner 
TECHNOLOGICAL UNEMPLOYMENT REVISITED: 
AUTOMATION IN A SEARCH AND MATCHING 
FRAMEWORK 
 
INEPA 
20-2018 Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer 
Andreas Neumayer 
 
THE PERSISTENCE OF OWNERSHIP INEQUALITY 
– INVESTORS ON THE GERMAN STOCK 
EXCHANGES, 1869-1945 
 
INEPA 
21-2018 Nadja Dwenger 
Lukas Treber 
 
SHAMING FOR TAX ENFORCEMENT: EVIDENCE 
FROM A NEW POLICY 
520 
22-2018 Octavio Escobar 
Henning Mühlen 
THE ROLE OF FDI IN STRUCTURAL CHANGE: 
EVIDENCE FROM MEXICO 
 
520 
23-2018 Davud Rostam-Afschar 
Kristina Strohmaier 
 
DOES REGULATION TRADE-OFF QUALITY 
AGAINST INEQUALITY? THE CASE OF GERMAN 
ARCHITECTS AND CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERS 
 
INEPA 
 
 
No. Author Title Inst 
    
24-2018 Peng Nie 
Lanlin Ding 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
OBESITY INEQUALITY AND THE CHANGING 
SHAPE OF THE BODYWEIGHT DISTRIBUTION IN 
CHINA 
INEPA 
25-2018 Michael Ahlheim 
Maike Becker 
Yeniley Allegue Losada 
Heike Trastl 
 
WASTED! RESOURCE RECOVERY AND WASTE 
MANAGEMENT IN CUBA 
520 
26-2018 Peter Spahn WAS WAR FALSCH AM MERKANTILISMUS? 
 
520 
27-2018 Sophie Therese Schneider NORTH_SOUTH TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE 
QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS: PANEL DATA 
EVIDENCE 
 
INEPA 
 
IMPRINT
University of Hohenheim
Dean’s Office of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Palace Hohenheim 1 B
70593 Stuttgart | Germany
Fon +49 (0)711 459 22488
Fax +49 (0)711 459 22785
wiso@uni-hohenheim.de
wiso.uni-hohenheim.de
